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Abstract 
 
From Rusche and Kirchheimer, to Freeman, to Wacquant, scholars have long theorized that 
labor market and criminal justice trends are linked. I extend theories of this type to explore whether 
and how labor market factors relate to differences in state incarceration rates across the United States 
from 1990-2012. Using scholarship from multiple disciplines, as well as my own analysis of state-
level aggregate data over 23 years, I show that analyses connecting labor market and penal policy 
realms provide useful insights into both policy areas. I employ year fixed-effects analyses and find 
that state labor market policies and conditions are related to state incarceration practices in visible 
and significant ways. In particular, states with more indicators of labor market freedom, such as no 
minimum wage laws and limited collective bargaining protections, tend to have higher incarceration 
rates. These differences are only partially mediated by differences in state economic conditions and 
state government ideologies. I then add measures of race to my analysis and find evidence that 
relationships among labor market and criminal justice policy spheres are contingent and racialized. 
For example, differences in labor market policies and conditions that matter for American 
populations generally speaking, matter little for African American populations specifically. As a 
whole, I find that state-level evidence in many ways supports theories that American free market 
policies over the last two decades been coupled with an increased use of "the iron fist" of state 
criminal justice practices. I also find, however, that this relationship has not been universal. My 
analysis suggests that functionalist accounts of the interplay of labor markets and criminal justice 
spheres are overly simplistic and miss an important racial story. I conclude by showing that these 
findings have consequential implications for actors interested in reducing incarceration in America 
today.  
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Introduction 
Everyone keeps asking me, "How is this possible?" I have five words for you: "Liberty and 
justice for all." The ever-expanding incarceration industry has begun to violate some of the 
deepest and most sacred principles of BOTH major political parties. […] For example, the right 
takes very seriously the concept of "liberty." Conservatives and libertarians want to defend the 
rights of every individual to pursue his or her dreams. They favor limited government. They hate 
massive, failed, bloated government bureaucracies. […] On the other hand, progressives like me 
care passionately about the "justice for all" part. […] Over the last 30 years, both parties helped 
lead us down the path to mass incarceration. It will take both political parties to reverse course. 
-- Van Jones, March 26, 20151 
 
What do Koch Industries and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have in common? 
Not much. These two interest groups are known for representing opposite ends of the American 
political spectrum. Koch Industries, heavyweight funders of Tea Party activities and a range of 
conservative campaigns, are symbols of "small government," individualist approaches to governance 
and citizenship. The ACLU, meanwhile, centers its activities on ideals of "rights and justice" and can 
be understood as a beacon of liberal and collectivist governing methods. When it comes to labor 
market policy, for example, Koch Industries and the ACLU are seasoned opponents. Koch Industries 
actively pursues free-market policies, favoring minimal government constraints on employers, while 
the ACLU supports policies aimed at protecting employee rights and laborer interests, frequently 
advocating for increased employer regulation. 
Despite their opposing positions on most issues of governance, Koch Industries and the 
ACLU recently announced their shared commitment to reducing incarceration in the United States, 
together founding the well-funded Coalition for Public Safety in March 2015. Today, Koch 
Industries and the ACLU claim common ground on the goal of addressing "America’s over-
incarceration problem." Even so, these two interest groups continue to represent opposite positions 
                                                     
1 Van Jones, March 26, 2015, A Cause That Unites the Right and Left http://www.channel3000.com/news/jones-a-cause-that-
unites-the-left-and-right/32025016?item=0 
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on labor market policy.2 Do these labor market policy differences matter for those concerned with 
America’s over-incarceration problem? If so, how? 
In this paper, I consider one facet of these questions by testing an extension of Rusche and 
Kircheimer’s classic hypothesis, that criminal justice practices and labor market policies follow 
similar trajectories (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1933). Specifically, I look at differences across states 
from 1990-2012 and examine whether and how variation in state incarceration rates reflect 
differences in state labor market conditions and policies.  
I show Rusche and Kirchheimer’s core argument to be useful: labor markets matter for 
criminal justice outcomes, and criminal justice outcomes matter for labor markets. I also demonstrate 
that commonly theorized relationships among these two policy areas are not observed in all cases, 
confirming that functionalist accounts of labor market effects on penal policy are incomplete. In fact, 
by exploring states that do not fit expected patterns and employing racial sub-group analysis, I show 
that functionalist accounts miss critical insights about how race matters in relationships among 
criminal justice and labor market policy spheres in the U.S. today. 
In what follows, I first discuss prominent theories from multiple disciplines to create a 
comprehensive starting point for considering how labor market factors and incarceration rates may be 
expected to relate at the state level from 1990-2012.  Next, I employ year fixed-effects models to 
explore associations among labor market factors and incarceration across states within this time 
period. I construct a labor market policy index that measures state policies regarding minimum wage, 
public employee collective bargaining rights, Prevailing Wage, and "Right to Work" laws. I use this 
index to analyze how state labor market policies relate to state incarceration rates when a variety of 
factors are controlled for. I then extend this analysis by exploring the role of state racial composition 
among state labor market and criminal justice policies, identifying important nuances within 
relationships among labor market conditions and state imprisonment rates.  
                                                     
2 See http://www.coalitionforpublicsafety.org/; and http://www.nationalreview.com/article/415029/coalition-public-safety-robert-
l-woodson-sr 
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There is wide consensus that a broad range of political, social, and economic factors 
influence state incarceration differences. I will demonstrate that, according to evidence from the last 
two decades, state policy choices matter too. The policy choices that matter, however, are not 
necessarily the ones we think.  
Literature Review 
Beyond Rusche and Kirchheimer 
 
Rusche and Kirchheimer are well known for making the argument that punishment practices 
reflect levels of labor supply and demand (Rusche and Kirchhheimer 1933). Specifically, they 
posited that in capitalist societies, punishments would be harsh during times of high labor surplus and 
more lenient during times of labor shortage. Many researchers have critiqued this claim and other 
elements of Rusche and Kirchheimer's basic theories, pointing out that their conceptualization of a 
direct relationship between labor market factors and penal practices is overly simplistic (Garland 
2012: 109). Of particular concern, Rusche and Kirchheimer neglect to address complexities 
introduced by intermediary processes, such as politics, ideologies, institutions, legislative systems, 
and individual actors, through which economic conditions and interests may influence the penal 
realm (Garland 2012: 108-110). 
Even so, a number of scholars have extended Rusche and Kirchheimer’s premise in 
analytically useful ways confirming that, while not a necessity, labor market and penal policy realms 
can and often do influence each other. For example, researchers have shown that an unemployment-
imprisonment relationship is at times observed in the U.S and other advanced capitalist societies 
(Micholowski and Calrson 1999; King et al. 2012). These researchers make clear that exploring the 
politically and historically contingent nature of this relationship is a valuable undertaking in itself as 
it can provide insight into the very intermediary processes Rusche and Kirchheimer ignored 
(Micholowski and Calrson 1999). 
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To begin to explore such intermediary processes, in the remainder of this section I organize 
past scholarship into theoretical categories to map out key avenues by which it is reasonable to 
expect that labor market and criminal justice spheres have influenced each other across American 
states over the last two decades. I first show how incarceration can be understood to affect labor 
market conditions. Next, I describe ways labor market conditions may affect incarceration, both via 
increases in crime and via increases in social insecurity. I then give attention to theories of linked 
policy regimes, discussing research based on the premise that labor market and criminal justice 
policies may be linked via governing rationalities and strategies. Finally, I consider several important 
factors that are likely to play important roles in structuring relationships among state criminal justice 
and labor market spheres, emphasizing the critical role of electoral politics and the American 
federalist political structure.  
Prison as a Labor Market Institution 
 
U.S. labor markets are sometimes suggested to be less constrained by institutional 
intervention than those of European welfare states (Giersch 1993). Under this view, times of strong 
economic performance in the U.S, relative to European countries, are sometimes attributed to 
America’s lower levels of unionization and fewer welfare subsidies (Scarpetta 1996). This, according 
to neoclassical economic theory, allows wages to better adjust to market conditions. In Europe, 
neoclassical theorists argue, institutions introduce inefficiencies. In particular, large welfare states 
and strong unions limit demand for labor and reduce incentives to work  (Western and Beckett 1999: 
1031).  
 Scholars have shown, however, that accounts of the U.S. labor market that neglect to 
consider the penal system as a labor market institution are incomplete (Western and Beckett 1999). 
Over recent decades, periods in which the U.S. economy has outperformed European economies 
have, in fact, been accompanied by significant state intervention in the U.S. labor market through the 
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expansion of the American penal system. Both in terms of incarceration rate increases and state 
spending on corrections, the American criminal justice system expanded dramatically relative to 
other advanced economies over the last three decades. Since the 1980s, the American penal system 
can be understood as playing a far greater role in U.S. labor markets than traditional labor market 
interventions such as unemployment benefits and employment related services. In the early 1990s, 
for example, $91 billion were spent on courts, police and prisons in the U.S. while only $41 billion 
were spent on all unemployment benefits and employment related services (Western and Beckett, 
1999: 1031; Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, Table 585). 
 Western and Beckett show that there are two primary and conflicting dynamics through 
which the incarceration boom in the U.S. has impacted labor market conditions (Western and Beckett 
1999). In the short run, incarceration lowers unemployment levels by removing working-age 
Americans from the labor force. In the 1990s, Freeman pointed out that the proportion of working-
age men in U.S. prisons approximated that of long-term unemployed men on public assistance in 
many western European countries (Freeman 1996: 26). In the long-run, incarceration raises 
unemployment rates by reducing employment opportunities of the formerly incarcerated. Research 
has shown that incarceration causes formerly incarcerated individuals to have poor employment 
records for years into the future, controlling for many other factors and in comparison to their own 
pre-prison employment (Freeman 1992). Based on these trends, a compelling case can be made that 
strong U.S. labor market performance, in the 1980s through the mid-2000s, was influenced by high 
and increasing incarceration rates. 
Poor Job Prospects Increase Crime 
 
 While the research discussed above focuses on the effect of incarceration on labor markets in 
the U.S, another line of research has explored the reverse direction of impact, emphasizing the 
impact of labor market conditions on incarceration.  First, many scholars have suggested that labor 
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market conditions influence penal practices through changes in crime rates. Research of this type is 
based on the premise that as job prospects for poor Americans decrease, incentives to commit crime 
increase, leading to both increased crime rates and increased incarceration rates.  
 Freeman's work exemplifies this line of scholarship. Freeman (1996) shows that, for low-
skilled, low-wage workers, the returns to legal employment have decreased over recent decades. He 
points out that from the mid-70s through the 1990s, real earnings fell substantially for the least 
educated and lowest-wage workers. He suggests that earnings for these individuals dropped 
approximately 20-30 percent in this time period, indicative of a substantial decrease in the demand 
for low skilled labor in the U.S. (Mishel and Bernstein 1994; Freeman 1996). Freeman and many 
other scholars contend that even as real wages have fallen, returns to criminal activity have increased. 
Ethnographic studies confirm that, in large part due to transformations within the informal drug 
market, incentives increased markedly in 1980s and 1990s for low income men in urban areas to 
engage in criminal behavior (Bourgois 1995; Bourgois 1996; Tonry 1995; Anderson 1999). 
According to this view, the American prison boom over of the last few decades is linked to the labor 
market primarily through an increase in crime, which is driven by increased unemployment and 
decreased wages for low-skilled workers. 
Government of Social Insecurity Theories 
 
 Researchers from the fields of sociology and political science expand on analyses such as 
Freeman's, suggesting that labor market conditions influence incarceration through more than crime 
rates alone. Scholars of contemporary American politics have suggested that criminal justice policies 
may be used to govern the social insecurity that accompanies certain labor market configurations. 
Scholars in this field suggest that criminal punishment can be understood as “express[ing] 
authorities’ reaction to perceived menace of marginal populations” (Western 2006: 2295). Thus, to 
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the extent that labor market factors cause an increase in perceived social insecurity, penal policies are 
expected to become more punitive, whether or not crime increases. 
 Understanding penal policies and practices as tools in the government of social insecurity has 
two key implications for theorizing relationships among labor markets and incarceration rates. First, 
increases in unemployed and low-wage populations are expected to be viewed as an increased risk to 
public safety. Rather than basing criminal justice policy on actual crime conditions, authorities may 
base criminal justice policy on the perceived risk of crime associated with perceived economic 
conditions within certain populations (Simon 2013). Second, to the extent that economically 
marginalized groups appear to refuse to work in available jobs, or reject dominate conceptions of 
work and achievement, these populations may represent a threat to economic and social order 
broadly speaking (Western 2006; Quinney 1974). 
Thus, some scholars have explicitly argued that changes over recent decades in the U.S. labor 
market have depended on the simultaneous expansion of the criminal justice system. Exemplifying 
explanations of this type, Wacquant (2001; 2009) suggests that the penal system is employed in the 
government of social insecurity to ensure that lower class Americans “accept” unstable economic and 
social conditions associated with neoliberal labor market configurations. According to Wacquant, 
“the invisible hand of the market and the iron fist of the state combine and complement each other to 
make the lower classes accept desocialised wage labour and the social instability it brings in its 
wake” (Wacquant 2001). In particular, Wacquant contends that poor African American men 
represent a certain type of social order threat in the American imagination, leading them to be 
specifically targeted for incarceration. Writing in 2001, Wacquant pointed out that while black men 
made up 6% of the U.S. population, they had accounted for over half of new prison admissions every 
year since 1989 (Wacquant 2001:403-404).  
Wacquant (2009) describes contemporary American incarceration practices as part of the 
"fourth peculiar institution," following slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the ghetto in the role of defining, 
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confining and controlling African Americans (98). Wacquant argues that a "carceral continuum" 
between prison and the "hyperghetto" arose in the wake of the decline of the communal urban ghetto 
of the Fordist-Keynesian era as a mechanism for keeping unskilled African Americans "in their 
place."  Wacquant suggests that slavery (1619-1865), Jim Crow (South, 1865-1965) and the 
communal ghetto (North, 1915-1968), each operated in various ways to organize and extract (cheap) 
labor from African Americans while simultaneously demarcating and excluding them in racialized 
ways. While Wacquant places the "hyperghetto + prison" in this historical trajectory of institutions 
that define and confine African Americans, he emphasizes several important differences from the 
three previous "peculiar institutions." These differences form the basis of his core thesis about this 
fourth peculiar institution: that the ghetto has become more like a prison, the prison has become more 
like the ghetto, and the two are linked in a carceral continuum that captures African Americans, 
particularly young black men, in a "never-ending circulus between the two institutions" (Wacquant 
2009: 97).   
Wacquant outlines four characteristics that both distinguish today's hyperghetto from the 
ghetto of the Fordist-Keynesian era and exemplify its "prisionization." First, today's hyperghetto is 
characterized by class segregation as well as racial segregation - middle and upper-class blacks no 
longer live in the same vicinity, resulting in the majority of ghetto residents being poor and 
unemployed. Second, in distinction from all three previous peculiar institutions, the hyperghetto 
serves no positive economic function, due to the decline in demand for urban factory laborers.  
According to Wacquant, the hyperghetto now "at best" serves a negative economic function of 
storage of a surplus population, just like a prison (Wacquant 2009: 105). Third, communal 
institutions such as the black press and churches have been replaced by state institutions of social 
control such as welfare/workfare agencies and extensions of the penal system such as police and 
parole officers (Wacquant 2009: 107). Fourth, the hyperghetto is no longer able to "buffer" residents 
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from external forces giving way to the depacification of everyday life via both increased crime and 
increased policing.  
 Empirical research has further demonstrated an interconnection among labor market and 
penal forces along racial lines. Western, Kleykamp and Rosenfeld (2006) use data from the National 
Correction Reporting Program and the Current Populations Survey, disaggregated by race and 
education level, to analyze labor market effects on prison rates using a variety of fixed effects 
models. Looking at state-level data from 1983-2001, they found that falling wages and 
unemployment significantly increased low-skilled black men’s incarceration rates. However, only 
falling wages impact low-skilled white men’s incarceration risk. These findings are consistent with 
other research that suggests that poor labor market conditions for low-skilled black men in poor 
urban neighborhoods exposes them to greater scrutiny from police and heightens perceptions of their 
dangerousness (Western et al. 2006: 2304; Steffensmeier et al. 1998). Such concerns of social 
insecurity are less pronounced when white populations are seen to suffer declining economic 
conditions (Western et al. 2006). 
 Soss, Fording and Schram (2011), find further evidence in support of the “racialized labor 
market” interpretation of the incarceration boom, advanced by Western (2006) and Wacquant (2009).  
Using disaggregated state-level panel data to explore determinates of prison rate changes from 1976-
1995, Soss et al. find that declining wages for low-skilled white workers have only a minor effect on 
white incarceration rates. Meanwhile, declining wages for low-skilled black workers substantially 
increased the likelihood of incarceration for African Americans (Soss et al. 2011: 108). Together, this 
research gives evidence that perceptions of social threat are often racialized in present-day America. 
In particular, where economic conditions are perceived to be volatile for poor African Americans 
penal policy is likely to be more punitive, regardless of actual crime rate changes. 
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Linked Policy Regimes Theories 
 
 As discussed above, some researchers have examined the effects of labor market conditions 
on incarceration, while others have explored the effects of incarceration on labor markets. I turn now 
to research that has explored relationships among labor market policies, particularly policy related to 
labor market regulation, and incarceration. Specifically, an important extension of Rusche and 
Kirchheimer's hypotheses is the conceptualization of linked policy regimes, in which governing 
rationalities and mechanisms actively bring together criminal justice and labor market policy fields.  
Recent research has drawn attention to broad shifts in dominant American governing 
strategies and rationalities that have linked criminal justice and labor market policy spheres in new 
and consequential ways (Simon, 2007). Beckett and Sasson (2000) are well-known for making the 
case that throughout the 1980s and 1990s the U.S. transitioned from a welfare state to a "security 
state" characterized by decreases in government spending on poverty relief and expanded use of the 
penal apparatus. Similarly, Beckett and Western (2001) analyze state-level incarceration rates and 
find that large penal systems are found in states with weak welfare systems. They take this 
association to be further evidence that labor market policy and criminal justice policy operate hand-
in-hand as part of a single punitive policy regime. Importantly, Beckett and Sasson (2000) and 
Beckett and Western (2001) emphasize the role of political actors and economic elites in deliberately 
employing strategies to bring about these punitive shifts across policy fields in the post-1990 United 
States. 
 Soss, Fording and Schram (2011) expand on these arguments, giving a more nuanced 
description of the fundamental shifts in American poverty governance that Beckett, Sasson, and 
Western point to. Looking at both macro and micro level evidence, they show that paternalist and 
neoliberal trends have converged across policy realms leading to "a mode of poverty governance that 
is, at once, more muscular in its normative enforcement and more dispersed and diverse in its 
organization" (Soss et al. 2011: 3). By Soss et al.’s account, both labor market policy and criminal 
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justice policy can be understood as central areas in which mechanisms and rationalities that advance 
neoliberal paternalist agendas play out. 
 Soss et al.'s argument is similar in many ways to Wacquant's. They agree, for example, that 
racialized changes in American labor market conditions occurred concurrently with changes in the 
penal realm. However, for theorizing relationships among labor market and penal policy domains, 
there are several important ways Soss et al.'s account differs from Wacquant’s. First, rather than 
seeing current neoliberal economic shifts as a rollback of the welfare state, Soss et al. contend that 
neoliberalism has been characterized by more state involvement in economic and social programs, 
transformed in fundamental ways to serve markets and structured around market principles. Second, 
Soss et al. reject Wacquant’s argument discussed above, that the urban poor serve no positive 
economic purpose. Instead, they show that welfare programs have been redesigned to mimic market 
pressures, becoming sites where state power is used to pursue market objectives (Soss et al. 2011: 7). 
Third, in contrast to Wacquant’s functionalist explanation for the rise of the “fourth peculiar 
institution,” Soss et al. focus on the role of political institutions, agents, and rationalities, in the 
transformation of poverty governance. They make clear that while poverty governance logics and 
policies across policy areas are observed to function in certain ways, they do not do so by necessity. 
They point to the importance of exploring how and why poverty governance functions, whether in 
social welfare, labor market, or criminal justice spheres, without falling into the trap of assuming that 
it must always function in this way. 
Electoral Politics and Federalism 
 
Electoral politics have also played a key role in both generating and mediating labor market 
and criminal justice policies. Two phenomena are particularly important for considering the 
relationship between labor markets and penal policy in the United States.  First, criminal justice 
policy is known to play a uniquely communicative and symbolic role which can be leveraged by 
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political actors (Durkheim 1902; Durkheim 1933; Smith 2008). Among other effects, this makes it 
politically expedient for authorities to focus on crime control, rather than other policy concerns, 
particularly at times when government legitimacy is threatened. Second, the federalist political 
system plays a critical role both in structuring and altering the links among criminal justice and labor 
market policy in the United States. 
Taking up this first phenomenon, scholars have pointed to the rise of “tough-on-crime” 
rhetoric and policy in the 1980s and 90s as a prime example of how the symbolic power of penal 
policy can work in relation to changes in the labor market sphere. Scholars have shown that tough-
on-crime policies were engaged by politicians in large part in response to government legitimacy 
crises of the 70s and 80s, where an economic squeeze on the American middle class contributed to 
wide-spread public skepticism of government abilities across policy fields (Scheingold 1995). 
Research suggests that rather than addressing large-scale structural economic shifts that were 
responsible for much of this increased mistrust of government, politicians found it easier to gain 
political capital by focusing attention on crime and crime control (Page 2004). Thus, it is argued, 
politicians deliberately engaged the uniquely symbolic power of crime and punishment policy to 
actively redirect public attention away from economic issues, towards crime control concerns. 
Beckett (1994) showed, for example, that public opinion followed rather than led tough-on-crime 
political mobilizations in this era. 
Providing a compelling example of this interplay of labor market conditions, politics and the 
symbolic power of penal policy, Page explores the 1994 debate around revoking Pell Grants to 
prisoners. In this case, a minor education subsidy for prisoners that served rehabilitative and order 
maintenance purposes became a public “outrage” and was ultimately repealed. Page shows how this 
niche criminal justice policy was used by politicians and other authorities to gain favor with 
constituents, even when the policy proposal itself had little to do with stated policy goals (Page 
2004).  
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Accounts such as Page’s indicate that the 1990s were characterized by an increase in 
punitiveness in criminal justice spheres in which the strategic actions of political actors were of 
central importance. Page outlines a convergence of socio-historical developments that formed the 
context of criminal justice policy debates in the 1990s. He points out that the early 1990s saw 
increasing popular rejection of the rehabilitative ideal of punishment. This, together with increased 
mistrust of government, including the government’s ability to fight crime, led to a reduced “buffer of 
experts” between populist ideas and criminal justice policymaking. These trends were accompanied 
by an increased competition among political elites to promote symbolically charged policies to show 
they were “doing something” about crime and punishment (Page 2004: 370-371). Engaging the 
symbolic power of penal policies, Page points out, was particularly effective for gaining political 
capital in a wider social context of a general assault on the undeserving poor. In particular, this time 
period was marked by a shift of the archetypical poor person from “just like us” (rural and white) to 
“dangerous and undeserving” (black and urban) (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Page 2004:371). 
Structural aspects of the American political system also play important roles in shaping and 
mediating relationships among criminal justice and labor market spheres. Miller (2010) shows that 
understanding the distinctive character of the American federalist system is also critical to 
understanding criminal justice outcomes in American states, particularly in regards to racial 
disparities in crime and punishment politics (806). Miller points to two influential consequences of 
the American federalist political system in the criminal justice realm. First, federalism limits the 
authority and incentives of the federal government to address the wide range of social problems that 
give rise to crime. Second, federalism diffuses political power across multiple venues, which makes 
it difficult for poor and low-resource groups to access decision-making (Miller 2010, 806). Miller 
claims, therefore, that the nature of the American federal system obscures the ways in which 
disparities in crime and punishment are linked to broader socioeconomic patterns (Miller 2010: 807).  
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Miller finds that central lawmaking structures of the American political system discourage 
sustained attention to connections between crime and larger social issues. Members of congress are 
rarely held accountable for their positions on local crime problems, but have multiple incentives to 
respond to single-issue interest groups and criminal justice agencies. Local policy makers, 
meanwhile, are constrained in their ability to significantly address economic conditions. Thus, even 
when local policy makers perceive crime to be an outcome of economic situations, the American 
political system often leads local and national actors to converge on responses to crime that increase 
punishment rather than dealing with these foundational economic concerns (Miller 2010: 834).  
 
 The scholarship discussed above makes a strong case that labor market and penal practices 
have interacted in meaningful and complex ways in the U.S. over the last two decades. In the 
following section, I explore these relationships further in a series of state-level empirical analyses. In 
the first set of analyses, I construct models that estimate the relationship among state incarceration 
rates and state labor markets, analyzing the effectiveness of labor market policies, unemployment, 
crime, government and ideological differences in explaining state incarceration rate variation. In the 
second set of analyses, I include race in a variety of ways to explore whether and how the general 
relationships I observed in my initial analyses are maintained when a racial dimension is added. 
Analysis 
Data and Variables 
 
 Drawing from a variety of sources, I have constructed a panel data set of state year aggregate 
data, for all U.S. states, from 1990-2012. All variables used in my analysis, and the sources for these 
data, are listed in Appendix Table A1. My main dependent variable for the following analyses is the 
incarceration rate of sentenced prisoners in a state compiled by the National Prisoner Statistics 
Program. I use the rates calculated and published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics measuring the 
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imprisonment rate of sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional 
authorities per 100,000 U.S. residents. 
 As my primary measure of state labor market policy, I constructed an index based on four 
state policies: Right to Work Laws, Prevailing Wage Laws, Minimum Wage Laws and Public 
Employee Collective Bargaining Laws. These index components are described in more detail in 
Table 1. Both exploratory factor analysis and cluster analysis suggested these policies loaded onto a 
single factor. I therefore determined that a simple additive index would be appropriate for the 
purposes of this study. This index ranges from 0 to 4. Lower values on the index indicate state policy 
regimes with fewer labor market constraints. A state with a Labor Market Policy Index score of 0, for 
example, would have a Right to Work statute, no prevailing wage laws, a minimum wage below the 
federal baseline, and laws explicitly or implicitly prohibiting public sector collective bargaining. A 
state with an index score of 4, on the other hand, would have no Right to Work statute and would 
have prevailing wage laws and a state minimum wage above the federal baseline, as well as policies 
favorable toward public sector collective bargaining. 
Table 1. State Labor Market Policy Index Description 
Index 
Component 
Explanation Labor Market Policy Index 
Score  
Right to 
Work Law 
Right to Work statutes prohibit agreements between labor 
unions and employers that would require employees, covered 
by a union, to pay union dues. Twenty-five states currently 
have Right to Work provisions. 
0 = state has Right to Work law; 1 
= state does not have Right to 
Work law 
Prevailing 
Wage Law 
State prevailing wage laws require state governments to pay 
the “prevailing wage” for various classes of construction 
roles on publically financed projects. Thirty-two states have 
some form of prevailing wage law. 
0 = state has prevailing wage law; 
1  = state does not have prevailing 
wage law 
 
Minimum 
Wage 
States may set state-wide hourly minimum wage laws. When 
states have no minimum wage or have set a minimum wage 
lower than the federal minimum wage, the federal minimum 
wage prevails. In January 2015, 29 states had minimum 
wages set above the federal minimum of $7.25. Fifteen states 
had minimum wages set at the federal level and 6 states have 
a minimum wage below the federal level. 
0=state has no minimum wage or 
minimum wage is below federal 
minimum; 0.5=state minimum 
wage is the same as the federal 
minimum wage; 1=state minimum 
wage is above federal minimum 
Public 
Employee 
Collective 
Bargaining 
Public employee collective bargaining provisions refer to 
state policies that define the legal rights and limitations on 
public-sector collective bargaining processes. In 2012, 10 
states had laws that were “unfavorable” toward public 
employee collective bargaining, 14 states had “intermediate” 
0=Unfavorable: no provision or 
collective bargaining prohibited; 
0.5=Intermediate: collective 
bargaining authorized but not 
required; 1= Favorable: duty to 
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laws, and 26 states had “favorable” laws. bargain explicit or implicit 
Index Range: 0-4 
0=state has less constrained labor market; 4=state has more constrained labor market 
*Sources for each component are listed in Appendix Table A1 
 As my main measure of labor market conditions, I use state unemployment rates. After 
testing a variety of alternative economic measures, such as poverty (Appendix A2) and economic 
inequality measures, I found that for the purposes of this study unemployment rate adequately 
captures the general relative health of state economies. However, this aggregate state unemployment 
rate measure would not be appropriate for more nuanced analyses. 3 
 Across all models, I control for crime rates and state government ideology. I use the violent 
crime rate from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports as a measure of relative state crime rates. For this 
study, I use a state’s violent crime rate in the current period. I also tested models with crime rates 
lagged multiple years and found the results to be similar (Appendix A3). I use Berry et al.’s measure 
of Government Ideology measuring the mean position of state elected officials on a liberal-
conservative continuum, weighted by their power over policy decisions (Berry, Ringquist, Fording 
and Hanson 1998). Lower values indicate more conservative state government ideology and higher 
values indicate more liberal government ideology. In some analyses, I also include Berry et al’s 
measure of Citizen Ideology which measures the mean position of a state’s “active electorate” on this 
same liberal-conservative continuum. I use the revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series, again with 
lower values indicating more conservative citizen ideology and higher values indicating more liberal 
citizen ideology (1998). Both the Citizen Ideology and Government Ideology measures are computed 
and compiled by Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson and are described in detail in Berry et al. 
(1998). 
                                                     
3
 As a sensitivity check I also tested models that instead use poverty rates, inequality measures, and interactions of poverty rates 
and unemployment rates. As suggested above, it is important to note that state unemployment rates are endogenous with state 
incarcerations rates. For example, incarceration can decrease unemployment measures in the short run by removing individuals 
from the labor market. Furthermore, unemployment rates do not capture those entirely dissociated with the labor market, nor do 
aggregate unemployment rate measures pick up differences in unemployment across racial, gender or class groups. 
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Methods 
 
 In the following analyses, I primarily use year fixed effects panel regression models. With 
observations across all 50 states over 23 years (N=1150), the panel nature of my data set, together 
with year fixed effects techniques, offers important analytical advantages. First, it allows me to 
control for obvious concurrent factors, such as crime rates and state government partisanship. 
Second, I am able to zero in on how state labor market differences relate to state incarceration 
differences by controlling for national trends. Using year fixed effects removes the national trend, 
each year, from the dependent and independent variables in the model. Any remaining association 
can therefore be attributed to differences across states rather than differences across time. Thus, year 
fixed effects limit the possibility of spurious correlations due to a time trend. Of particular 
importance, because incarceration rates have been rising rapidly across most states over the last 23 
years, without year fixed effects, any independent variable that also trended in one direction over 
time would appear to drive incarceration rates. Using year fixed effects removes this concern. 
Finally, I also apply clustered robust standard errors by state to all my fixed effect models to correct 
for heteroskedasticity that I expect to be clustered by state.   
 Numerous studies have attempted to explain the causes of the American incarceration boom 
over the last few decades. This is not one of those studies. This study is not designed to make causal 
inferences. Instead, the methods I’ve chosen are intended to help illuminate correlational 
relationships across policy areas at the state level. The multi-directional, contingent, and mutually 
reinforcing relationships that are expected among labor markets and criminal justice practices make 
correlational methods both appropriate and valuable for a study of this type. By focusing on 
correlational techniques, my intention is to use admittedly imperfect state aggregate measures to 
illuminate patterns that can help us better understand relationships among labor market and criminal 
justice spheres in the United States broadly speaking.  
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Results and Discussion: Labor Market Policies and State Incarceration Rates 
 
 To explore the relationships among labor market policies, labor market conditions, and state 
incarceration rates, I ran a variety of year fixed effects models, regressing state incarceration rates on 
the labor market policy index and several key controls. Results from this analysis are reported in 
Table 2.  
Table 2. Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, Year Fixed Effects Models, 
1990-2012, 50 States 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Labor Market     -45.45*** -40.23*** -36.49*** -39.09*** -27.83** 
Policy Index (12.08) (10.11) (10.75) (10.52) (11.56) 
Violent     0.32*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
Crime Rate  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Government   -0.42 -0.44 0.01 
Ideology     (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) 
Unemployment    16.79** 16.30** 
Rate          (7.56) (7.44) 
Citizen        -2.19* 
Ideology       (1.11) 
R
2
         0.31 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.57 
N          1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
R2 with year fixed effects only (no other covariates) = 0.13 
Incarceration and violent crime rates are out of 100,000 U.S. residents. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
 
 
 As shown, there is a statistically significant relationship between a state’s labor market policy 
index score and its incarceration rate. Recall, higher labor market policy index scores indicate state 
labor markets are more constrained, the opposite being true of low indices.  The present results 
suggest that states with more market-constraining labor market policy have lower incarceration rates. 
Conversely, states with less market-constraining labor market policy have higher incarceration rates. 
This relationship is significant and of substantial magnitude even when controlling for crime rates, 
state government ideology, and unemployment rates. When citizen ideology is included in the model, 
it has visible mediating effect while the labor market policy variable continues to be significant at the 
p<0.05 level. Here, we see evidence that the labor market policy index and the citizen ideology index 
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are similar to each other and are similarly related to state incarceration rates (See Table 3). Even so, 
they pick up slightly different aspects of state variation in incarceration rates.  
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients of Key Variables: State-level Measures, 50 States, 1990-2012 
  
Incarce
ration 
Rate 
Labor 
Market 
Policy 
Index 
Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
Govt. 
Ideology 
Unempl
oyment 
Rate 
Citizen 
Ideol 
ogy 
Black 
Popula
tion % 
Latino 
Populat
ion % 
Black 
Incarce
ration 
Rate 
Labor Market Policy 
Index 
-0.40 
        
Violent Crime Rate 0.38 -0.11 
       
Government Ideology -0.19 0.43 0.07 
      
Unemployment Rate 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.14 
     
Citizen Ideology -0.35 0.65 -0.10 0.60 0.05 
    
Black Population % 0.60 -0.42 0.51 0.05 0.16 -0.15 
   
Latino Population % 0.21 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.20 0.06 -0.14 
  
Black Incarceration 
Rate 
0.32 0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 -0.22 0.17 
 
Black Unemployment 
Rate 
0.19 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.47 -0.04 0.24 -0.01 0.08 
 
 Together, these models support many of the theoretical arguments described previously. 
First, the models indicate that the role of labor market conditions (measured here by unemployment 
rates), has not operated through crime rates alone. Even when crime rates are controlled for in the 
models, states with higher unemployment rates tend to incarcerate larger proportions of their 
populations. This supports government of social insecurity theories which suggest that incarceration 
is used more readily when states experience economic hardship, whether or not crime rates increase.  
 The models also show that state labor market policies play an important role, beyond 
differences in labor market conditions, in explaining differences in state incarceration rates. That is, 
state labor market policies are still strongly associated with state incarceration rates even after 
controlling for differences in state incarceration rates due to crime, government ideology, and 
unemployment levels. This supports linked policy regimes theories, in showing that labor market 
policy and criminal justice policy have followed similar patterns in recent years, patterns that cannot 
be explained by government ideological differences or state economic conditions alone. 
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 In addition to the models presented in Table 2, I tested a range of alternate models to check 
the robustness of my results across specifications. I tested models constrained to different time-
periods to explore whether these relationships varied markedly by time-period. I also added a variety 
of additional control variables, including urban composition, GDP per capita, sentencing policy 
variables and alternate measures of crime rates (Appendix A3 and A4). I found similar results to 
those presented here.  
A closer look at key associations 
 
 To better understand how state labor market policies have related to state incarceration rates 
over the last two decades, I created a series of two-dimensional scatter plots in decade intervals. 
These are presented in Figures 1-3. 
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Figure 1 
  
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 Several additional observations are made clear by these graphs. First, it appears that a linear 
relationship between state labor market policy index scores and incarceration rates has become more 
pronounced over the last two decades. This difference has been driven largely by substantial 
incarceration rate increases in states with low labor market policy scores (less constrained labor 
markets). Second, there are several notable outlier states. In particular, four states – Utah, North 
Dakota, Iowa and Kansas – have low labor market policy scores and have state incarceration rates 
that are well below the national average. I will discuss these outliers in more detail in the following 
section.  
A third and particularly important observation is that the distribution of state incarceration 
rates appears to vary meaningfully with different labor market policy scores. States with low labor 
market policy scores have higher variation in incarceration rates, while states with lower labor 
market policy scores have less variation. As I will discuss in the concluding section of this paper, this 
variation provides interesting insight into the relationship among labor market and penal policy areas 
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in the U.S. today. We see that certain labor market policy regimes are observed to allow both low and 
very high incarceration rates, while other labor market policy configurations appear to constrain 
incarceration rates.  
Results and Discussion: Race-based Analysis 
A. Adding racial compositions measures 
 
 To begin exploring how race matters in the relationship among state labor market conditions 
and relative punitiveness, I added additional racial composition measures to my original models in 
Table 2. Table 4 presents my estimates when variables are added to the models for the percent of a 
state’s population that is African American and percent of a state’s population that is Latino.  
 
Table 4. Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, With Racial Composition 
Variables Included, Year Fixed Effects Models, 1990-2012 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Labor Market Policy     -23.26** -26.43*** -16.34* -18.63* -0.81 
Index (9.77) (9.64) (9.50) (9.66) (10.79) 
Black Population % 8.49*** 6.23*** 7.05*** 6.65*** 7.46*** 
 (1.45) (1.75) (1.66) (1.67) (1.50) 
Latino Population %   3.98** 2.31 2.38 2.1 2.46 
 (1.67) (2.04) (1.88) (1.88) (1.89) 
Violent  Crime  0.15** 0.14** 0.14** 0.11** 
Rate  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Government   -0.92*** -0.90*** -0.34 
Ideology     (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) 
Unemployment    8.36 6.57 
Rate          (6.02) (6.17) 
Citizen        -3.00*** 
Ideology       (1.07) 
R
2
        0.58 0.6 0.62 0.63 0.66 
N          1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 
VCE       cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
Incarceration and violent crime rates are out of 100,000 U.S. residents. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
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 As shown in Table 4, states where African Americans make up a larger percentage of the 
state’s total population tend to have higher incarceration rates, even after controlling for crime rates, 
unemployment rates, and government and citizen ideology. When other controls are added, such as 
urban composition and sentencing policy variables, this association continues to be robust (Appendix 
A5). It is also clear that the percent of a state’s population that is African American is correlated with 
state labor market policy. When measures of state racial composition are added to the models, the 
magnitude and significance of the state labor market policy variable decreases noticeably. States 
where Black Americans make up a higher percent of their population tend to have lower labor market 
policy scores (rlabor market index,%AfAm=-0.41). As the models show, these states also tend to have higher 
incarceration rates, even when crime and other key variables are held constant. These findings 
indicate that racial composition differences across states play a role beyond differences in state labor 
market policies and conditions. The correlation among these variables also provides suggestive 
support of theories that the extent to which African Americans are seen to be affected by weak job 
prospects or as targets of labor market policies affects how these factors relate to the relative 
punitiveness of a state’s penal practices. 
B. What do the outlier states tell us? 
 
 Next I take a closer look at the outlier states identified in Figure 3. We saw that in 2012, 
Utah, North Dakota, Kansas and Iowa stood out as having substantially lower than average 
incarceration rates while also having low labor market policy scores. In attempts to further 
understand these states, I compared measures of several variables measuring the relative population 
size and incarceration rates of African Americans in these states. These measures are reported in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Outlier States – 2012 Measures 
 Labor 
Market 
Policy Index 
Score 
State 
Incarceratio
n Rate 
Citizen 
Ideology 
Percent 
Black of 
Total State 
Population 
Percent 
Incarcerated 
of Total State 
Black 
Population 
Ratio: State 
Black 
Incarceration 
Rate to Total 
Incarceration 
Rate 
2012 National 
Average* 
2.04 397 48.45 10.2% 1.70% 4.26 
Utah 0.5 242 16.96 1.0% 1.73% 7.04 
North Dakota 1 213 48.45 1.4% 1.04% 4.94 
Kansas 1 325 35.85 5.8% 1.90% 5.70 
Iowa 1.5 282 40.50 3.0% 2.70% 8.88 
*Averages of state averages. 
  
 The measures presented in Table 5 suggest that states that have high labor market freedom 
and low incarceration rates also have low African American populations. Meanwhile, the rate at 
which black populations in these states are incarcerated is similar to the average across all states. Not 
surprisingly, the ratio of the black incarceration rates to the total state population incarceration rate is 
substantially higher than average in these states. For example, an African American in Iowa is more 
than eight times as likely as the "average person" in Iowa to be incarcerated. While this ratio is twice 
that national average, it must be noted that the average person in Iowa is about 30% less likely to be 
incarcerated than the average person in other states.   
 To further explore the relationship among state African American populations, state labor 
market policies, and state incarceration rates, I developed a series of scatter plots that include a racial 
composition dimension. These scatter plots mimic those presented in Figures 1-3, but this time states 
are represented by circles where the size of the circle is proportional to the percentage of African 
Americans in each state's population. 
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 Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 6. 
 
See Figure 3 for all state labels. 
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Here, we see that many of the states with the lowest labor market policy scores indeed have 
larger black populations relative to their state's total population. North Carolina stands out as unique 
in having a larger black population percentage and both low incarceration rates and a low labor 
market policy score. Indiana and South Dakota, meanwhile, are notable for having low black 
population percentages and higher than average incarceration rates. They also both have lower labor 
market policy scores. Among states with higher labor market policy scores, there is no clear pattern 
among state African American population sizes and incarceration rates. Even so, it is worth noting 
that all the states with larger than average incarceration rates and larger than average labor market 
scores (there are only 6 of these) also appear to have average to larger than average black populations 
as a percent of total state population.  
C. Modeling state Black incarceration rates 
 
  In one more attempt to learn more about the relationship among state labor market policies, 
incarceration rates, and race, I use similar models to above but this time use state black incarceration 
rates (the percentage of a state’s black population that is incarcerated) as the dependent variable. As 
shown in Table 6, I find that labor market policy measures and unemployment rates, including black 
unemployment rates, are far less successful at explaining variation in black state incarceration rates 
than they were at explaining variation in total state incarceration rates. 
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Table 6. Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates of Black Populations, Year 
Fixed Effects Models, 1990-2012, 50 States 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Labor      35.38 -20.22 17.93 30.37 3.83 52.63 
Market Policy Index (49.45) (56.12) (55.34) (57.52) (58.52) (70.57) 
Violent      0.51 0.49 0.57* 0.48 0.42 
Crime Rate   (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) 
Black Population %   -22.56*** -19.47** -18.03** -22.19*** -20.147** 
    (7.25) (7.51) (7.77) (8.17) (8.45) 
Government     -3.60* -3.68* -3.26* -1.81 
Ideology       (1.91) (1.86) (1.88) (1.69) 
Unemployment       -50.72     
Rate             (45.33)     
Black Unemployment         20.05 15.50 
Rate               (20.47) (19.62) 
Citizen              -8.03 
Ideology             (7.24) 
R
2
         0.1 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 
N          1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
Incarceration and violent crime rates are out of 100,000 U.S. residents. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
 
 
 
 Even using Black unemployment rates, the R2 of these models reaches only 0.21 where 
comparable models estimating incarceration rates for the total state population (Tables 2 and 4) had 
R2s ranging from 0.31 to 0.66. I also tried using Black employment-to-population ratio and a range of 
other controls, including sentencing policy variables, and achieved no higher than an R2 of 0.17 for 
models of this dependent variable (Appendix A6). Furthermore, variables that were robustly 
significant in previous models, such as labor market policy, crime rates, unemployment rates and 
government ideology do not appear significant in relationship to state Black incarceration rates. The 
size of a state's African American population, as a fraction of the state's total population stands out as 
a primary determinate of Black incarceration rates, suggesting that racialized policy mechanisms are 
in effect, and that this effect is of far greater influence than that of labor market conditions. These 
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results further support the theme that has emerged throughout this section; relationships among state 
labor market policies and conditions have operated differently for African Americans than for state 
populations as a whole. In particular, the extent to which Black Americans are perceived to be 
affected by labor market or criminal justice policies seems to be of key importance in explaining the 
nature of these policies – and their outcomes – in both fields.  
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This study confirms that those concerned with the reduction of U.S. incarceration rates need 
to take seriously differences in state labor market policies and conditions. Efforts to change 
incarceration practices will confront substantially different labor market environments across 
American states. To the extent that the past two decades are a guide, these labor market differences 
matter noticeably in the penal sphere. Policy approaches that ignore this relationship may be limited 
in their success. 
In showing that state labor market policy and incarceration rates are significantly related, 
even after controlling for key variables, my study finds particularly convincing evidence of linked 
policy regime theories. I find that states with more labor market freedom have, in fact, generally 
engaged wider use of incarceration, and this pattern has increased over the last two decades. In 
general, my analysis suggests that policy governing the “invisible hand” of labor markets has been, 
as Wacquant posits, visibly related to policy governing the “iron fist” of criminal justice systems in 
the context of American states today.  
This is important information for actors now seeking to reduce state incarceration rates. 
Successful efforts to address America's "over-incarceration problem" will likely require concurrent 
labor market interventions. The literature reviewed for this study suggests that labor market 
interventions may be needed that focus on increasing the stability of job opportunities for the poor, 
limiting public perceptions of social insecurity, and addressing governing rationalities. Future 
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research is necessary, however, to clarify the intermediary mechanisms at play in these relationships 
in order to tailor policy solutions accordingly. 
 My findings also show that theorists that propose a fixed relationship among labor market 
policies and incarceration outcomes – such a Rusche and Kirchheimer or Wacquant – miss multiple 
critical points. A key finding of my analysis is that differences in labor market policy regimes appear 
to affect the range of variation observed in state incarceration rates. Specifically, states with more 
constrained labor markets have a more limited range of observed incarceration rate differences. 
States with less constrained labor markets, in contrast, are observed to have a large range of 
incarceration rate variation. For advocates of the reduced use of incarceration, these findings suggest 
that while intervening in labor market policy is an important avenue for reducing incarceration, lower 
incarceration rates are possible across state labor market policy contexts. Such findings are hard to 
square with functionalist accounts that suggest a direct relationship among labor market regimes and 
penal practices.  
Preliminary exploration of the role of race in the relationship among labor market policy and 
state incarceration rate differences confirms that labor market and penal policy relationships operate 
in contingent and varied ways as proposed by many scholars discussed in the opening sections of this 
paper (Soss et al. 2011; Western 2006). First, in showing that racial composition measures often 
overpower and neutralize relationships otherwise observed among labor market and criminal justice 
domains, my findings suggest that the racialized application of penal policies and practices is of 
similar importance to that of labor market effects. State racial composition, labor market policies, 
economic conditions, and penal outcomes are interconnected in the contemporary American context 
and we should be cautious of considering any one of these factors in isolation. These findings are 
consistent with theories that decision making points throughout both criminal justice and labor 
market policy spheres are influenced by racial attitudes and perceptions (Soss et al. 2011).  
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In a second illuminating counter-example to functionalist accounts linking labor market and 
criminal justice policies, some states with smaller African American populations give evidence of 
being more able to decouple governing logics across labor market and criminal justice spheres. That 
is, the states that were able to maintain more collectivist criminal justice policy, even while having 
more individualist labor market policies, were states where African Americans make up a small 
percentage of the overall state population. This finding is consistent with theories of punishment 
emphasizing that levels of punitiveness depend on the extent to which those being punished are seen 
as “like us” by the general population (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Page 2004; Durkheim 1902). This 
evidence supports theories that policy practices affected by perceptions of social solidarity, and of 
threat, are often organized along racial lines. It may be that in states where the targets of criminal 
justice policies are more likely to be white or more likely to be perceived as white, the public is more 
willing to engage less punitive practices.  
Even so, in these states where criminal justice and labor market trends appear to exhibit 
distinct governing rationales – where labor market constraints are limited and incarceration rates are 
lower – the below-average incarceration rates enjoyed by the general state populations are not 
experienced by the state’s African American populations. Thus, I find further evidence that the 
racialized application of criminal justice policies is more important for Black Americans’ experience 
of penal policy than other theoretically important determinates. Differences in labor market policies 
and conditions that matter for American populations generally speaking, appear to matter little for 
African American populations specifically. 
In exposing significant associations among aggregate measures of state labor market and 
penal policy conditions, this study has illuminated a number of launching points for future research. 
This macro-level exploration of the interplay of state labor market policy and incarceration outcomes 
points to opportunities for micro-level analyses that tease out the intermediary processes at work in 
the relationships observed. What more can we learn, for example, about links among state racial 
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compositions, limited labor market constraints, and high incarceration rates? What role do politics, 
institutions, elite actors or other intermediaries play in these relationships? Furthermore, why are 
African American incarceration rates so much less well explained by labor market factors? Are 
racialized perceptions and attitudes key determinates here? And, are these determinates historically 
contingent? If so, what explains this contingency? Future research should pursue questions such as 
these. This study is also limited by the use of aggregate state-level measures. Future research of this 
type would be enhanced by employing disaggregated measures and analyses, particularly along race 
and class dimensions – dimensions which this study has confirmed are of critical importance within 
the policy and practice relationships uncovered here. 
This paper began by asking if policy differences in the labor market sphere will matter in 
efforts to reduce U.S. incarceration rates. Throughout this study, an answer has emerged. Over the 
past two decades, at the state-level, labor market policy differences have indeed played a meaningful 
role in state incarceration outcomes. The nature of this relationship, however, is anything but fixed. 
For better or for worse, this study makes clear that in the United States of the future, how labor 
markets will matter for penal practices – and how penal practices will matter for labor markets – will 
depend on the actions of the stakeholders involved. 
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Appendices 
A1. Key Variables Sources 
Variable Source 
Incarceration Rate Bureau of Justice Statistics. Imprisonment rate of sentenced prisoners under 
the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities per 100,000 U.S. 
residents, December 31, 1978-2013. 
Generated using the Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool at www.bjs.gov. 
Violent Crime Rate Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. Uniform 
Crime Reporting Statistics. UCR Data Online at  
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/. Accessed 3/31/15. 
Government Ideology William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, Russell L. 
Hanson. https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ 
Updated Measures of Citizen and Government Ideology (Last Updated 
03/19/2015). Using ADA/COPE Scores. 
Citizen Ideology William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, Russell L. 
Hanson. https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ 
Updated Measures of Citizen and Government Ideology (Last Updated 
03/19/2015). 
Unemployment Rate Employment Status of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population, 1976-2007.  
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 
program. 
Black Population % Compiled using United States Census data 
Latino Population % Compiled using United States Census data 
Black Incarceration Rate Compiled by author using Bureau of Justice Statistics National Prisoner 
Statistics Data and U.S. Census State Population Estimates 
Black Unemployment Rate Compiled using Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census State 
Population Estimates 
Labor Market Index  
Right to Work Law National Conference of State Legislatures; 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-
and-bills.aspx#chart 
Prevailing Wage Law United States Department of Labor; 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/dollar2013.htm 
Minimum Wage U.S. Department of Labor; 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm 
Public Employee Collective 
Bargaining 
Valletta and Freeman (1988) updated by to 1996 by Kim Reuben, updated 
manually by author to 2012; http://www.nber.org/publaw/ 
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A2. Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, Year Fixed Effects Models, 1990-
2012, 50 States: Unemployment and Poverty Rates Alternative Models 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Unemployment 26.00*** 7.43 10.64 16.79** 
   Rate       (9.49) (9.14) (8.40) (7.56) 
   Violent    
 
0.34*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 
 
0.30*** 0.29*** 
Crime Rate 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Government 
  
-1.38*** -0.44 
 
-1.15*** -0.47 
Ideology   
  
(0.35) (0.35) 
 
(0.34) (0.33) 
Labor Market      
   
-39.09*** 
  
-29.52*** 
Policy Index 
   
(10.52) 
  
(10.22) 
Poverty    
    
18.87*** 12.01** 8.41** 
Rate       
    
(5.11) (4.64) (4.17) 
R
2
        0.18 0.39 0.45 0.55 0.32 0.51 0.56 
N          1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010; SE’s in parentheses 
 
 
A3. Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, Year Fixed Effects Models, 1990-
2012, 50 States: Primary models with Lagged Crime Rates 
           Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Labor      -39.41*** -35.91*** -38.88*** -27.99** 2.19 
Market Policy Index (10.35) (11.20) (11.11) (12.22) (10.94) 
Violent    0.27*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.03 
Crime Rate (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Crime Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 
Lagged 1 Year (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Crime Rate 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.02* 
Lagged 2 Years (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Government 
 
-0.4 -0.41 0.03 -0.38 
Ideology   
 
(0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.34) 
Unemployment 
  
16.81** 16.56** 6.29 
Rate       
  
(8.05) (7.91) (6.55) 
Citizen    
   
-2.18** -3.03*** 
Ideology   
   
(1.08) (1.04) 
Black Population % 
    
8.03*** 
     
(1.53) 
Latino Population %   
    
2.39 
     
(1.96) 
R
2
         0.52 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.67 
N          1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010; SE’s in parentheses  
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A4: Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, Year Fixed Effects Models, 1996-
2012, 50 States: Controlling for other variables, including sentencing policy variables 
 
           Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Labor      -22.2 -36.54*** -39.06*** -20.98 
 Market Policy Index (14.51) (12.96) (12.16) (13.86) 
 Violent    0.22** 0.26*** 0.25** 0.21** 0.37*** 
Crime Rate (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Government 0.08 -0.44 -0.4 0.16 -1.12*** 
Ideology   (0.37) (0.38) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) 
Unemployment 3.14 6.08 7.17 4.4 
 Rate       (9.79) (9.90) (9.28) (9.18) 
 Citizen    -2.77** 
  
-3.12** 
 Ideology   (1.31) 
  
(1.30) 
 Poverty    15.45** 14.50** 15.06** 15.56** 
 Rate       (6.17) (6.38) (6.28) (6.05) 
 GDP per    0 0 0 0 
 Capita     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Percent Pop   1.11 0.5 0.81 1.52* 
 Living in Metro Areas (0.81) (0.68) (0.86) (0.90) 
 Determinate 
  
-7.59 -7.09 -13.1 
Sentencing 
  
(33.91) (33.42) (36.14) 
Sentencing 
  
-4.03 -11.73 -16.83 
Guidelines Measure 
  
(13.73) (12.23) (13.77) 
Three      
  
-20.85 -11.96 11.43 
Strikes Law 
  
(27.60) (25.77) (27.49) 
Truth in   
  
4.33 15.35 32.2 
Sentencing Law 
  
(33.30) (29.31) (32.59) 
Legalized  
  
19.69 21.88 -29.44 
Medical Marijuana 
  
(24.75) (24.68) (28.31) 
Decriminalization 
  
-38.11 -41.12 -15.91 
of Marijuana 
  
(29.10) (31.45) (34.65) 
R
2
         0.56 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.47 
N          800 800 800 800 1150 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
Incarceration and violent crime rates are out of 100,000 U.S. residents. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
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A5: Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rates, Year Fixed Effects Models, 1996-
2012, 50 States: Controlling for other variables, including Black Population % 
 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Labor      2.68 -16.92 -21.04** 4.25 
 Market Policy Index (13.33) (11.08) (9.51) (11.67) 
 Violent    0.11 0.17* 0.12 0.06 0.19*** 
Crime Rate (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) 
Government -0.33 -0.91** -1.01*** -0.38 -1.37*** 
Ideology   (0.34) (0.35) (0.30) (0.28) (0.32) 
Black Population % 6.24*** 5.62*** 6.92*** 7.82*** 7.88*** 
 
(1.64) (1.70) (1.71) (1.57) (1.45) 
Unemployment -2.57 1.51 -0.78 -5.32 
 Rate       (8.53) (8.66) (7.81) (7.64) 
 Citizen    -3.36** 
  
-3.96*** 
 Ideology   (1.28) 
  
(1.21) 
 Poverty    13.48** 12.55** 13.49** 13.92*** 
 Rate       (5.31) (5.77) (5.30) (4.73) 
 GDP per    0 0 0 0 
 Capita     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Percent Pop   0.79 0.09 0.57 1.45* 
 Living in Metro Areas (0.73) (0.65) (0.77) (0.77) 
 Determinate 
  
-6.08 -5.25 -1.1 
Sentencing 
  
(25.70) (24.31) (26.92) 
Sentencing 
  
-2.89 -12.52 -11.75 
Guidelines Measure 
  
(12.94) (11.02) (11.67) 
Three      
  
-24.62 -13.82 -3.65 
Strikes Law 
  
(25.29) (21.30) (24.07) 
Truth in   
  
-10.3 1.81 0.37 
Sentencing Law 
  
(33.25) (27.22) (28.86) 
Legalized  
  
66.37*** 75.16*** 37.69 
Medical Marijuana 
  
(24.75) (23.20) (24.43) 
Decriminalization 
  
-51.60* -57.16* -38.41 
of Marijuana 
  
(26.68) (29.60) (25.94) 
R
2
         0.64 0.6 0.63 0.69 0.62 
N          800 800 800 800 1150 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
Incarceration and violent crime rates are out of 100,000 U.S. residents. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
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A6: Effects of State Differences on State Incarceration Rate of State Black Populations, Year 
Fixed Effects Models, 1996-2012, 50 States: Controlling for other variables including sentencing 
policy variables 
           Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Labor      3.83 52.63 -34.37 -31.03 
Market Policy Index (58.52) (70.57) (60.83) (57.17) 
Violent    0.48 0.42 0.44 0.14 
Crime Rate (0.31) (0.29) (0.41) (0.47) 
Government -3.26* -1.81 -1.82 -2.1 
Ideology   (1.88) (1.69) (2.00) (1.75) 
Black      2005.32 1550.06 2291.32 3666.65* 
Unemployment Rate (2047.16) (1962.54) (2252.38) (2085.94) 
Black Population % -22.19*** -20.15** -22.35*** -19.39* 
 
(8.17) (8.45) (8.28) (9.71) 
Citizen    
 
-8.03 
  Ideology   
 
(7.24) 
  Poverty    
  
-7.77 1.36 
Rate       
  
(27.04) (23.36) 
GDP per    
  
0.01 0.02* 
Capita     
  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Percent    
  
-3.75 -4.44 
Pop Living in Metro Areas 
 
(4.48) (4.92) 
Determinate 
   
-56.56 
Sentencing 
   
(136.06) 
Sentencing 
   
-1.35 
Guidelines Measure 
   
(70.86) 
Three      
   
110.6 
Strikes Law 
   
(166.67) 
Truth in   
   
84.2 
Sentencing Law 
   
(197.63) 
Legalized  
   
257.91 
Medical Marijuana 
  
(173.74) 
Decriminalization 
   
-337.97** 
of Marijuana 
   
(152.70) 
R
2
         0.19 0.21 0.14 0.22 
N          1095 1095 750 750 
VCE        cluster cluster cluster cluster 
Year fixed effects and clustered robust standard errors, clustered by state, applied to all models. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.010 
SE’s in parentheses 
 
 
 
